In the oft-cited decision of Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (U.S. 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court modified the standard of proof required to establish harm from discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Two years later, we assess the proofs needed to satisfy the Muldrow standard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. We focus on proofs,
rather than allegations, because nearly all of the decisions citing Muldrow arose in the summary judgment context, although one decision (Registre) addressed a motion to dismiss, and another (Bonsall) addressed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. My analysis is admittedly incomplete, as I focused on those cases with written decisions and ignored cases that were either filed and settled; or proceeded to trial without a written decision.

But the import from the decisions we reviewed is inescapable nonetheless: while Muldrow helped plaintiffs to survive summary judgment, courts in the Third Circuit will not hesitate to rule against plaintiffs who failed to establish the required proof of “some harm” to a term or condition of employment. In Jones v. SEPTA (3d Cir. 2015), the Third Circuit held that an adverse employment action for the purpose of Title VII and Section 1981 was “an action by an employer that is serious and tangible enough to alter
an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” (finding that a paid suspension was not an adverse employment action).
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